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Does public knowledge of climate change really matter in Australia?
Abstract 
Replicating questions on climate change and polar knowledge from the United States, this 
study examines the impact of climate related facts for predicting acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change, and for predicting Green voting in Australia.  Analysis of national survey 
data from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes show that the likelihood of Green voting 
increases with climate knowledge.  Climate-related knowledge is also positively associated 
with acceptance of anthropogenic climate change, but the effect of knowledge is moderated 
by party political identification.  Greens, Labor Party identifiers and politically un-affiliated 
Australians align more closely with the scientific consensus on climate change as their 
climate knowledge increases.  However, climate knowledge has no effect on the climate 
change attitudes of Liberal and National party identifiers.  Climate knowledge also interacts 
with gender.  Climate knowledge has a stronger association with anthropogenic climate 
change beliefs among women than it does among men.  These findings suggest the 
information deficit model of science communication is likely to be efficacious among 
supporters of politically progressive parties in Australia, but less so among political 
conservatives. 
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Does climate knowledge matter?
Introduction
The consensus position of climate scientists regarding anthropogenic climate change (ACC) 
is well established.  According to estimates, between 90 and 100 per cent of climate scientists 
agree that ACC is occurring (Powell, 2015; Cook et al., 2013; Anderegg et al., 2010; Doran 
and Zimmerman, 2009; Oreskes, 2004), with a recent survey claiming 97 per cent of 
published climate scientists hold that global warming has mostly anthropogenic causes (Cook 
et al. 2016).  On the face of it, greater public awareness of the consensus position of climate 
scientists should be associated with greater agreement that anthropogenic climate change is 
occurring.  However, the association between climate change knowledge and acceptance of 
ACC is not straightforward (e.g. Hamilton 2011; Hamilton, Cutler and Schaefer 2012; Kahan 
et al. 2012; Kahan 2015).  Most people are not climate scientists, nor able to access or 
interpret relevant scientific evidence relating to climate change.  Public opinion on climate 
change to a large extent seems to depend upon what people believe rather than know about 
climate change.  Further, acceptance of anthropogenic climate change varies considerably 
according to one’s sources of news and information (e.g. Carmichael et al. 2017; Bacon 
2013), level of education (Hamilton 2011; Hamilton et al. 2015), world views (e.g. Kahan et 
al. 2012) and political party identification.  
Citizens of the United States and Australia are polarised politically over ACC.  In the United 
States, Democrats and Republicans are strongly divided (e.g. Wood and Vedlitz, 2007; 
Jacques et al., 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2010; 2011a, 2011b; Hamilton et al., 2015; 
Hamilton 2016), while in Australia similar divisions are apparent between supporters of the 
Greens and Labor parties on one hand and the Liberal and National parties on the other 
(Fielding et al. 2012; Tranter, 2011; Tranter and Booth, 2015).  In the United States, 
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researchers have found political polarisation on climate beliefs also varies according to 
education level and knowledge of climate-related facts (e.g. Ehret et al. 2017; Hamilton et al. 
2012, 2015), with important implications for the communication of climate science 
(Hamilton and Fogg 2019).  In a partial replication of Hamilton’s work in the US, this 
research examines how knowledge of climate change and political party identification 
interact to predict ACC beliefs in Australia.  It also extends previous research on Green 
voting by considering how climate-related factual knowledge influences voting for the 
Greens in Australia.  
Climate Change Knowledge 
Participation in the democratic process requires a politically informed citizenry (Dahl 1982).  
As Rapeli (2014, 18) puts it, ‘an enlightened public’ is ‘a prerequisite for the democratic form 
of governing.’  Political knowledge enhances participation in politics, promotes political 
tolerance, and enables citizens to form ‘stable, consistent opinions on a broad array of issues’ 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 219).  Jennings (1996, 229) distinguish three types of 
‘factual’ political knowledge: knowledge of ‘the mechanics of government and politics’; 
knowledge of ‘ongoing events and political developments’; and ‘historical facts’ (1996, 229).  
Similarly, for Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 10), political knowledge is ‘the range of 
factual information about politics that is stored in the long-term memory’, while for Rapeli 
(2010, 27), it is the ‘command of verifiable facts related to politics’.  Delli Carpini and Keeter 
(1996, 219) claim that informed citizens are able to ‘identify their true interests and connect 
these with their political attitudes’.  Although many voters experience difficulty correctly 
answering basic factual questions about politics (McAllister 1998; Tranter 2007).   
A similar rationale underpins the communication of climate science to the public in a given 
society.  Scientific findings relating to climate change are communicated via mass and other 
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media with the aim of informing ‘the public’.  Informed citizens should then be better placed 
to act on climate related issues, such as reducing carbon emissions by using less energy.  This 
‘information-deficit model’ (Suldovsky 2017), implies that the ‘failure of the public to 
possess a clear understanding of climate science leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the topic, and underlies the difference between the scientific and public understanding of it” 
(Brulle et al 2012: 174-5).  As Hamilton and Fogg (2019, 10) point out (citing Cook et al. 
2017, Farrell et al. 2019 and van der Linden et al. 2017), ‘Experimental studies that find 
opinions changing after provision of information give support to this view, as does recent 
work on “inoculating” people against misinformation’.  Hamilton and Fogg (2019, 10) argue 
that the ‘positive effects of education, knowledge or science literacy on ACC acceptance’ 
found in non-experimental studies (e.g. Ehret et al. 2017; Hamilton et al 2012, 2015) also 
support the information deficit model.
The deficit model suggests that resistance to information from climate scientists is due to an 
inability to comprehend the evidence.  However, Huxster et al. (2018) warn of the need to 
distinguish ‘knowledge’ from ‘understanding’.  They suggest one understands 
…a subject (issue, concept, theory, …) only if one grasps how a constellation of facts relevant to that 
subject are related to one another (causally, inferentially, explanatorily, &c.) in such a way as to be able 
to make new connections or draw new inferences with novel information. As a result, the object of 
understanding is always a body—and never a single piece—of information. (Huxster et al. 2018, 759).
Many scientists and science communicators do not engage effectively with the public, with 
climate scientists often reluctant to engage in public debates (Besley and Nisbet 2013; Besley 
and Tanner 2011).  This can impede scientists’ ability to ‘persuade the lay public of the 
correctness of scientific conclusions’ (Lewandowsky et al. 2015, 9).  It also potentially 
undermines the influence of scientific evidence in the development of government policy in 
contemporary democracies (Leith et al. 2017).    
Besley and Nisbet (2013: 647-655) surveyed scientists regarding public understanding of 
science, finding scientists tend to perceive the public as homogenous, with ‘education deficit’ 
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viewed as a barrier for public understanding (Simis et al. 2016).  Addressing this knowledge 
deficit remains the dominant scientific communication goal (Peters and Dunwoody 2016), at 
least partly to control the delivery of science informed messages to policy makers and the 
public in an era where ‘fake news’ has the potential to undermine evidence-based arguments.  
In fact, Lester and Foxwell-Norton (in press) argue science communicators need to recognise 
that the communication of science is but one domain of legitimacy and authority in 
environmental debates.  
The association between climate change knowledge and ACC acceptance is complex, as it 
interacts with other factors, such as education and political party identification.  In the United 
States, political polarisation over climate change increases with higher levels of self-reported 
climate knowledge, and with higher educational attainment (Hamilton 2011; Hamilton et al. 
2015).  Hamilton et al. (2015) show that political conservatives in the US are less accepting 
of anthropogenic climate change as their education level and knowledge of climate change 
increases, while informed and educated liberals become more accepting.  Lewandowsky and 
Oberauer (2016, 217) found that ‘general education and scientific literacy do not mitigate 
rejection of science, but, rather, increase the polarisation of opinions along partisan lines.’  
Kahan et al. (2012, 732) also found that ‘members of the public with the highest degrees of 
science literacy and technical reasoning capacity were not the most concerned about climate 
change.  Rather, they were the ones among whom cultural polarization was greatest.’  Among 
liberal Democrat party identifiers who adopt progressive positions on climate change, higher 
levels of ‘ordinary climate science’ knowledge is associated with beliefs that global warming 
is mainly due to the burning of fossil fuel, yet among conservative Republicans, greater 
science knowledge is associated with increasing scepticism of such claims (Kahan 2015, 27).  
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In the United States (and I expect in Australia), polarisation over scientific findings arises 
when issues challenge worldviews, such as the importance of the free market (Kahan 2015; 
Lewandowsky et al. 2016).  Public trust in climate scientists is also critical for 
communicating climate science.  Democrats and independents are far more likely than 
Republican or Tea Party identifiers to trust climate scientists as a source of information about 
climate change (Hamilton et al. 2015; 2016).  Politically charged and divisive terms such as 
‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ also influence attitudes, as they have become 
shorthand for partisan positions on political issues (Hamilton 2015).  While Weber and Stern 
(2011, 315) acknowledge ‘public understanding is affected by the inherent difficulty of 
understanding climate change’, they also note the ‘continuing societal struggle to shape the 
frames and mental models people use to understand the phenomena.’
Knowledge of climate change varies according to social background.  The literature on 
gender and environmentalism suggests women are more likely than men to hold pro-
environmental attitudes and engage in pro-environmental behaviour (Zelezny et al. 2000; 
Dietz, Dan and Shwom 2007).  Climate scepticism is higher among men in several Western 
countries (Tranter and Booth 2015), while in Australia, women are more concerned about 
environmental issues in general, and about climate change in particular (Tranter 2014; 2018).  
Women score higher than men on climate change knowledge scales in the United States 
(McCright 2010), in contrast to measures of general scientific and environmental knowledge 
where men score higher (Hayes 2001).  Examining a series of opinion poll data, McCright 
(2010, 66) found women were more concerned than men about climate change, a finding that 
was ‘not accounted for by differences in key values and beliefs or in the social roles that men 
and women differentially perform in society’.  
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Climate Knowledge in Australia
While considerable research has been conducted in Australia on public attitudes regarding 
climate change (e.g. Fielding et al. 2012; Tranter 2011; 2014; 2017; 2018; Kousser and 
Tranter 2018), less is known about the association between climate change knowledge and 
acceptance of ACC.  As we have seen, knowledge of climate change is associated with 
climate change beliefs in the US, but this association varies considerably according to 
political partisanship (e.g. Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2016; Hamilton 2015).  In Australia, 
men score higher than women on self-assessed measures of climate change, with low self-
assessed climate knowledge linked to sceptical beliefs about ACC (Tranter 2017; Tranter 
2018).  What has not been explored in Australia is how factual rather than self-rated climate 
knowledge is associated with accepting ACC.
  
In keeping with Firebaugh’s (2008, 90) ‘replicate where possible’ rule, I repeat aspects of 
Hamilton’s (2015, 2016) research on polar knowledge and public beliefs in anthropogenic 
climate change.  In recent years replication has been the subject of vigorous discussion in 
various science disciplines (e.g. see Nature 2014) and in the social sciences (e.g. see Finkel et 
al. 2015).  Recent social psychological research on the communication of climate risks 
demonstrates the importance of replicating research findings (see Ballard and Lewandowsky, 
2015; Sleeth-Keppler et al. 2019).i  The current research is what Freese and Peterson (2017, 
152) refer to as a ‘generalisation’ study, a form of replication where ‘the original study 
provides a premise for research trying to evaluate whether similar findings may be observed 
consistently across different methods or settings’.  I explore whether knowledge of climate-
related facts is related to ACC beliefs in Australia, as it is in the USA.  
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I analyse nationally representative survey data from Australia to explore a) the social and 
political correlates of climate change knowledge, b) how knowledge of climate change is 
associated with climate change beliefs, and c) voting for the political party most supportive of 
action on climate change, the Australian Greens.  The following research questions are 
examined.
Research Questions
1. How knowledgeable are Australians compared to Americans on climate-related 
issues?
2. How well does knowledge of climate related facts predict ACC beliefs in Australia? 
3. How strongly associated with ACC beliefs are climate knowledge, social background 
and political party identification?
4. To what extent do ACC beliefs, climate knowledge, social background and political 
party identification influence Green voting in Australia?
Data and Method
Data are from the 2017 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), a national social 
survey designed to be representative of the Australian adult population.  The AuSSA sample 
was randomly selected from the Australian Electoral Roll ‘by federal electoral division in 
proportion to the size of the division versus the total enrolled’ (Blunsdon et al. 2018).  A 
sample of 5000 people was selected and administered in 4 waves of 1,250 by mail survey.  
After ineligibles were removed, a response rate of 28 per cent was achieved (n = 1,317).
The author commissioned modules of climate change questions for the AuSSA from 2014 to 
2017.  Several of Hamilton’s (2015) questions were replicated in the 2017 AuSSA by the 
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author, including polar knowledge questions.  While there are similarities between the United 
States and Australia regarding the strong political divisions over anthropogenic climate 
change, replication of Hamilton’s polar knowledge questions allow comparisons of the level 
of climate related knowledge in each country.  The inclusion of polar knowledge questions in 
an Australian survey also enable the estimation of associations between climate related facts 
and acceptance of anthropogenic climate change in Australia, again, facilitating comparisons 
with the United States.
Several dependent variables are examined.  The first measures climate change attitudes based 
on the question ‘Which of the following statements do you personally believe’ and contrasts 
belief in ACC (i.e. climate change is happening now and mainly caused by humans = 1) with 
other responses (i.e. climate change is happening now but has mainly natural causes + climate 
change is not happening now + don’t know = 0).  Responses to this question are presented in 
Table 1 for 2014, 2015 and 2017.  The second dependent variable models self-assessed 
knowledge of climate change from the question ‘How much do you feel that you understand 
about climate change - would you say a great deal, a moderate amount, only a little, or 
nothing at all?’ (scored 1 = nothing at all to 4 = a great deal).  
The third dependent variable is based on responses to questions that replicate three of 
Hamilton’s (2015) polar knowledge questions.  Unlike some knowledge questions that refer 
directly to climate change and are politically polarising, the polar questions are claimed to be 
apolitical.  As Hamilton (2015, 100) suggests, ‘awareness of geography or the sea/land ice 
distinction, unlike other basic facts such as ice decline, appears unrelated to respondents’ 
politics or climate-change beliefs.’  Slight adjustments to question wording were made to the 
original items to change descriptions of distance (i.e. from miles in the USA to kilometres in 
Australia).  The distribution of the polar items is presented in Table 2.  The polar knowledge 
questions here do not comprise a comprehensive measure of climate change knowledge.  
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However, as Hamilton (2015, 100) acknowledges, the ‘polar knowledge score defined as the 
number of correct answers among sea level, North Pole and South Pole questions…provides 
a limited but analytically useful marker for knowledge.’  
Finally, voting behaviour is measured with the question ‘Thinking back to the last general 
election in July 2016 - Which party did you vote for?’ (responses: Labor Party [ALP], Liberal 
Party, National [Country] Party, Greens, Other party [please specify]).  A binary dependent 
variable was created with Green voting scored 1; all other parties were scored 0.
Binary and ordinal logistic regression analyses are performed using STATA version 15.  
Binary regression is used to examine ACC beliefs versus other responses regarding climate 
change, and individual items that comprise the polar knowledge scale.  Ordinal logistic 
regression is employed to examine self-assessed climate knowledge and the polar knowledge 
scale.  
As McCright et al. (2016) found, left of centre political ideology is associated with stronger 
support for action to mitigate climate change.  The political party identification question in 
the AuSSA asks ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party 
and, if yes, which party is that?’ Following Hamilton, Hartter and Saito (2015) and Kousser 
and Tranter (2018), a scale variable is operationalised in the regression models as a 
parsimonious measure of political party identification.  The scale scores Greens =1; 
Australian Labor Party [ALP] = 2; No party affiliation = 3; Liberal Party or National Party = 
4.  The party identification coding follows the way party identifiers align on a 0 to 10 left-
right ideology scale.  While the AuSSA does not contain such a scale, mean scores for 
respective political party identification responses from the 2016 Australian Election Study 
(McAllister et al. 2016), show that Green partisans (Mean 2.71) rate themselves to the left of 
Page 10 of 39
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/renc  Email: RENC-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
11
Labor (3.94), non-party identifiers (4.74), and Liberal (6.23) and National (6.29) party 
identifiers.  The Liberal and National parties are members of a coalition in Australian federal 
politics, with their partisans very closely located on the left-right scale based on Australian 
Election Study data.  Liberals and National are therefore combined as one category.  The 
small number of respondents affiliated with other parties (n = 32) and missing cases on the 
party identification question (n = 56) were coded 2, along with the modal category of non-
identifiers.
Five models are presented for the binary logistic regression analyses of belief in ACC 
compared to other responses regarding climate change in Table 4.  Model 1 includes only the 
polar knowledge scale (centred at its mean) and Model 2 social background variables, the 
influence respondent sex (1= women) age (in years), degree (1/0), household income of 
$100,000 or more (1/0), no religious affiliations (1/0), living in a large city (1/0) and being 
born in Australia (1/0).  
Model 3 includes only the party identification (party ID) scale (centred at its mean) and 
Model 4 is the full model that includes all main effect variables from Models 1 to 4.  Model 5 
adds three interaction terms, for women by the polar knowledge scale, women by the political 
party ID scale, and party ID by polar knowledge.  Descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables are shown in the Appendix.
[Table1 about here]
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Results
Table 1 contains responses to questions gauging attitudes toward climate change, and self-
assessed knowledge of climate change.  In 2017, approximately two thirds (65%) of 
Australians believed that climate change is occurring and has mainly anthropogenic causes, a 
significant increase from 61 per cent in 2014 (Fisher’s Exact Test p< .0001).  The 2017 result 
was slightly lower than that for 2015 at 67 per cent, although this difference does not 
represent a significantly different change in ACC acceptance at the 95 per cent level (Fisher’s 
Exact Test p> .302).  
While in 2014, 29 per cent of Australians claimed climate change has natural causes, this 
decreased to 13 per cent in 2015, before rising again to 19 per cent in 2017.  The change 
between each year was highly significant (Fisher’s Exact Test p< .0001).  The level of 
outright rejection of climate change is quite low, fluctuating between 3 and 5 per cent across 
the three samples, with a significant decline from 2015 to 2017 in the percentage of those 
believing climate change is not occurring (Fisher’s Exact Test p= .016).  However, the 
proportion of Australians claiming that they ‘don’t know’ whether climate change is 
occurring or not is around twice as high in 2015 and 2017 compared with 2014, based on 
these estimates.  While around two thirds of Australians believe climate change has 
anthropogenic causes, about one third either believe that climate change is a ‘natural’ 
phenomenon or are unsure what they believe.
Climate Change Knowledge 
The knowledge questions examined here replicate those asked on several regional or 
nationwide US surveys (e.g., Hamilton 2015).  The most definitive US results for comparison 
with Australia are those reported in Hamilton (2018).  Comparing self-rated climate change 
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knowledge, 17 per cent of Australians claim to know a great deal about climate change 
compared to 24 per cent of Americans (Table 2).  A further 48 per cent of Australians believe 
they possess a moderate amount of knowledge, once again, less than the 57 per cent of 
Americans (Table 2).  
Three quiz questions measure basic knowledge of the composition of the North and South 
Poles, and the implications of ice melt for sea level rise (Hamilton 2015).  Forty four percent 
(44%) of Australians and Americans correctly identified the North Pole as a thin layer of ice 
floating over a deep ocean (Table 2), while a slightly higher percentage of Americans (52%) 
than Australians (49%) correctly identified the South Pole as a thick layer of ice over land.  
Greater variation is apparent for the ‘ice melt’ questions (Australia 42%; USA 34%).  
Notably, however, for each of these quiz questions, Australians were far more likely than 
Americans to claim they did not know the correct answer.  For example, 36 per cent of 
Australians for the ice melt question, compared to only 12 per cent of Americans.  The lower 
proportions of ‘don’t know’ responses for Americans could indicate they are more likely to 
guess.  
[Table 2 about here]
Predictors of Polar Knowledge 
The social and political background of responses on the polar knowledge and self-assessed 
climate knowledge dependent variables are examined in Table 3 using ordinal logistic 
regression.  Self-assessed knowledge is based on the question ‘How much do you feel that 
you understand about climate change - would you say a great deal (4), a moderate amount 
(3), only a little (2), or nothing at all (1)?’  The polar knowledge scale ranges from 0 to 3 
(Responses: 0 = 28%; 1 = 29%; 2 = 27%; 3 = 17%).  
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[Table 3 about here]
Australian women score lower than men on both the self-assessed and polar knowledge 
scales, controlling for other influences.  Increasing age is associated with higher polar 
knowledge, but age is not associated with self-assessed knowledge, while tertiary graduates 
score higher than non-graduates on both dependent variables.  Those born in Australia (OR 
1.4) score higher on the polar scale, but do not believe they are more knowledgeable than 
people born elsewhere.
A borderline statistically significant association is apparent for party identification and the 
polar knowledge dependent variable (1.14; p = .049), but the party identification effect is far 
stronger for self-assessed knowledge (OR 1.32; p <.001), such that moving from conservative 
to progressive party identification is associated with higher perceived knowledge of climate 
change.  I also consider the association of different climate change beliefs as a predictor of 
polar and self-rafted knowledge.  The results indicate that those claiming they ‘don’t know’ 
whether climate change is happening, not only believe they have poor knowledge of climate 
change, they are less knowledgeable about polar facts.  Other things being equal, polar 
knowledge scores are similar for those who believe climate change has anthropogenic causes, 
that is ‘natural’ or those who claim it is not happening.  Australians who reject climate 
change show higher odds on the self-rated knowledge dependent variable, but the effect is of 
borderline significance (OR 1.9; p = .053).
These results are largely consistent with Tranter’s (2018) findings for self-assessed climate 
change knowledge.  Also, similar to McCright’s (2010) findings from the United States, 
Australian men score higher than women do on self-rated understanding of global warming.  
Yet, unlike McCright’s (2010) findings, in Australia, men score higher than women on 
factual questions relating to climate change.  
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Polar knowledge and believing in anthropogenic climate change
Binary logistic regression models show ACC acceptance regressed on polar knowledge, 
political party identification and social background variables (Table 4).  The likelihood ratio 
chi-squared tests in Table 5 estimate the utility of each model for predicting ACC beliefs.  
Interaction terms for women * polar knowledge, women * party identification, and party 
identification * polar knowledge were all significant in the regression models.  Predicted 
probabilities are presented in Figures 1 to 3 (based upon Model 5; Table 4) to illustrate the 
nature of these interaction effects.  
 [Table 4 about here]
Model 1 indicates that polar knowledge is significantly associated with acceptance of ACC 
(OR 1.33), but the pseudo R2 (McFadden’s) indicates relatively poor model fit compared to 
Models 2 to 3.   Nevertheless, Model 1 indicates that believing in ACC is more common at 
higher levels of polar knowledge.  Socio-demographic variables appear to offer a better fit 
with these data (R2 .08), with statistically significant positive associations for women (OR 
1.6), tertiary graduates (OR 1.9) and those who are not affiliated with any religious 
denomination (OR 1.8), while younger Australians are more likely than their elders to believe 
climate change has anthropogenic causes (OR 0.98).  Australians living in rural areas are less 
likely to agree with the scientific consensus on climate change than those living elsewhere 
(0.7).  Rural voters tend to vote for conservative political parties in Australia, but the rural 
estimate remains significant even when party identification is controlled (Model 4).
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Model 3 indicates that the political party identification scale has a strong association with 
climate change attitudes (OR 2.34), with ACC beliefs more likely moving from the mean of 
the scale toward Labor and the Greens, and less likely toward Coalition identifiers.  Model 4 
shows that even when all independent variables are included in the regression equation, 
political party identification and knowledge effects remain strong.  
Finally, the three interaction terms are illustrated graphically in Figures 1 to 3.  Acceptance of 
ACC is far more likely to increase among women compared to men as polar knowledge 
increases (OR 1.49).  Women and men who score zero on the polar knowledge scale vary 
little in their ACC beliefs, however the gender gap in climate beliefs widens as climate-
related knowledge increases (Figure 1).  The association between climate change beliefs and 
party identification also varies for men and women (OR 1.55), with women more likely than 
men to accept ACC (Figure 2).  Coalition men and women do not vary significantly in their 
ACC beliefs, but there are statistically significant gender differences among non-identifiers, 
and Labor and Greens identifiers; in each case, women are more accepting of anthropogenic 
climate change than men are.  
There is also an important interaction effect for party identification by polar knowledge on 
(OR 1.48).  The predicted probability of believing in anthropogenic climate change is 
positively associated with polar knowledge among non-identifiers, Labor, and Greens 
identifiers (Figure 3).  However, the horizontal plot for Coalition identifiers, indicates that 
acceptance of ACC does not change as polar knowledge increases.  Climate-related 
knowledge has no impact upon accepting the scientific consensus on climate change among 
political conservatives.
The likelihood ratio chi squared tests indicate the model fit is diminished by dropping either 
polar knowledge, the social background variables, or political party identification from 
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Model 5.  Dropping the three interaction variables also results in a poorer fit with these data.  
However, the likelihood ratio tests also show the party identification scale fits these data far 
better than social background, or polar knowledge for modelling beliefs in anthropogenic 
climate change (Table 5). 
[Figures 1 – 3 about here]
Voting for the Australian Greens 
The dichotomous Greens voting variable is examined in Table 6 using binary logistic 
regression analysis, using similar models to those in Table 4.  Previous research has shown 
that compared to Labor and Liberal/National party supporters, Australia Greens supporters 
tend to be younger, more likely to live in cities and to be tertiary educated, although less 
likely to claim a religious affiliation (Wilson 2002, Bean and McAllister 2009; Miragliotta 
2013).  In the models presented in Table 6, respondent age is measured as several dummy 
(1/0) variables rather than a continuous measure, as the age/voting relationship is non-linear.  
Belief in anthropogenic climate change is also operationalised as a dummy independent 
variable in these models.  Finally, a variable prioritising government action on global 
warming versus economic growth is derived from the question: ‘Which of the following do 
you believe is the most important for the future of Australia?’: Australian government policy 
should prioritise economic growth (53%), scored 0; Australian government policy should 
prioritise the reduction of global warming (47%) scored 1.
[Table 5 about here]
The likelihood of voting Green increases with polar knowledge (Model 1), with the odds of 
Green voting increasing by 1.32 above the mean for a unit change on the polar knowledge 
scale.  Social background effects are apparent, with women showing 50 per cent higher odds 
of voting Green than men (OR 1.5) in Model 2, although the gender effect is non-significant 
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in the full model (Model 5).  Australians aged 30-49 show higher odds of voting Greens than 
either the youngest age group (18-29) or those aged 60 and over, while consistent with 
previous Australian research (Tranter 2014), the tertiary-educated (OR 2) and the non-
religious (OR 3.2) are more likely to vote Green.  Age, education and religion effects also 
remain significant in the full model (Model 5). 
Not unexpectedly, Model 3 indicates that accepting ACC is strongly associated with Green 
voting (OR 7.3).  Yet by far the strongest effect is observed for the government policy 
variable.  The odds of voting Green among those who prioritise action on global warming, 
are 12 times larger than for those who prioritise economic growth (OR 11.8).  Interestingly, 
prioritising global warming renders the impact of both polar knowledge and ACC acceptance 
weaker and non-significant in Model 5.  Other analyses (not shown here) confirm that these 
changes are not due to the influence of social background variables.  The most important 
indicator of voting Green is believing that the Australian government should reduce global 
warming over boosting economic growth.  Likelihood ratio chi square tests confirm the 
policy priority variable is most strongly associated with Green voting, followed by social 
background variables.  Dropping either ACC beliefs or polar knowledge from the full model 
(Model 5) does not result in a statistically significant difference in model fit (Table 7).
Discussion
Replicating survey questions employed by Hamilton (2015, 2016, 2018), I find Australians 
score lower than US citizens on self-rated climate change knowledge.  However, on climate-
related factual questions about the North and South poles, Australians and Americans 
perform similarly, with Australians scoring somewhat higher on the implications of melting 
ice for rising sea levels.  
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Hamilton (2015, 89) found that ‘responses to climate linked factual questions, such as 
whether Arctic sea ice area has declined compared with 30 years ago, are politicized as if we 
were asking for climate change opinions.’  However, scientific facts ‘such as whether the 
North Pole is on land or sea ice’ were not politicised among US citizens (2015, 89).  A key 
expectation in this research was that as knowledge of polar facts rises, Australians’ views on 
climate change should align more closely with the consensus position of climate scientists 
(Cook et al. 2016; Powell, 2015; Cook et al., 2013; Anderegg et al., 2010; Doran and 
Zimmerman, 2009; Oreskes, 2004).  Indeed, I find a positive main effect for polar knowledge 
as a predictor of ACC beliefs.  Yet, knowledge of polar facts also interacts with political 
party identification as a predictor of ACC beliefs.  The propensity to accept ACC increases 
with polar knowledge among Greens, Australian Labor Party identifiers and those who do not 
identify with any political party.  However, knowledge has no effect on ACC acceptance 
among Liberal and National identifiers.  It seems that acceptance of anthropogenic climate 
change is unrelated to climate change knowledge among political conservatives in Australia.  
Hamilton and Fogg (2019, 8) also found an interaction effect for political party by polar 
knowledge, indicating that Republicans are not more likely to accept ACC as their polar 
knowledge increases.  Hamilton and Fogg (2019)ii and my Australian findings appear to 
indicate that ‘physical-world knowledge’ such as polar facts have also become politicised.  
Perhaps through assimilation bias (e.g. Corner et al. 2012; Ehret et al. 2017; McCright and 
Dunlap 2011) or a related process, ideologically conservative citizens in both countries 
interpret factual questions about polar regions as associated with rising sea levels.  Political 
conservatives link such questions to anthropogenic climate change, so that polar facts become 
politicised.  These findings are intriguing, although tentative, with further research required 
to establish if they can be replicated in their respective countries. 
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In broad terms, the Australian findings are consistent with Lewandowsky and Oberauer 
(2016, 220, citing Cook and Lewandowsky, 2016), who found ‘participants who strongly 
supported free market economics lowered their acceptance of human-caused global warming 
in response to information about the climate consensus’.  The lack of a polar knowledge 
effect for Liberal and National Party identifiers could be underpinned by beliefs that climate 
change does not constitute a serious global risk.  It could also reflect a form of identity 
protection (whether conscious or otherwise) among conservative Australians, if they ‘form 
distinct attitudes toward risk in a manner that protects from interference the activities on 
which their identities depend’ (Kahan et al. 2007, 498).  As Lewandowsky and Oberauer 
(2016, 217) put it, ‘people tend to reject findings that threaten their core beliefs or 
worldview’.
Social background impacts polar knowledge.  Australian men rate themselves higher than 
women do on self-assessed climate knowledge, with men also scoring higher on factual 
knowledge questions.  These Australian results are consistent with Hayes’ (2001) 
environmental knowledge findings for the United States, the UK, Norway, Netherlands, 
Germany and Japan.  Further, tertiary educated Australians score higher than non-graduates 
on both self-assessed climate knowledge and polar knowledge.  While no association is 
evident for age and self-assessed knowledge, older Australians tend to score higher on factual 
climate-related questions.  The latter finding is consistent with higher scores among older 
citizens on environmental knowledge in several Western countries (Hayes 2001), climate 
change knowledge in the United States (McCright 2010) and political knowledge in Australia 
(McAllister 1998; Tranter 2007).
While Haynes (2001) found no interaction between gender and scientific knowledge in 
predicting environmental attitudes, a gender by polar knowledge interaction is apparent for 
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accepting ACC in Australia.  Acceptance of anthropogenic climate change increases with 
polar knowledge among both men and women, but in Australia the effect is far stronger 
among women.  Zelezny et al. (2000, 454) found women ‘reported stronger ecocentrism 
(concern for nature, the biosphere, and all living things) than males’.  It appears that 
Australian women may be more receptive than men to the climate consensus position because 
they prioritise different value (McCright, 2010).iii  
The Australian Greens champion action on climate change and proffer more progressive 
climate policies than the major parties (Rootes 2011), so voting Green arguably represents a 
commitment to action on climate change.  Tranter (2007) found politically knowledgeable 
Australians were more likely to vote Green than for other parties in the Senate (Tranter 
2007).  This research extends previous findings on Green voting, revealing that climate-
related factual knowledge is correlated positively with Green voting.  However, prioritising 
global warming over economic growth is by far the most important correlate of voting Green 
in Australia, surpassing the effects of climate change beliefs and climate related facts.    
Limitations
This study has potential limitations relating to the measurement of climate knowledge, 
political party identification and voting behaviour.  First, the association between climate 
change knowledge and accepting ACC may be understated, because I measure climate-
related polar facts rather than factual questions about climate change.  Yet, as Hamilton 
(2015, 102) shows, responses to climate change knowledge questions (e.g. regarding Arctic 
ice decline or atmospheric CO2 increases) ‘behave as if we are asking for people’s climate-
change opinions, which have become acutely politicized…to the extent they serve as 
ideological or cultural markers.’  For example, climate change sceptics may know the climate 
science consensus position (e.g. CO2 emissions cause global warming) but reject such a claim 
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because it conflicts with their strongly held worldviews (Kahan 2015; Lewandowsky and 
Oberauer 2016).  Directly measuring climate science facts to operationalise knowledge of 
climate change is, therefore, potentially problematic.  Nevertheless, further research is 
required to establish whether responses to factual climate change questions are politically 
polarised in Australia, as they are in the United States.  
Second, the measurement of party identification utilised here may overstate the association 
between political party identification and belief in ACC.  Political party identification is 
measured in the AuSSA with the question ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close to any 
particular political party and, if yes, which party is that?’  The addition of ‘close to’ in the 
AuSSA question may result in measuring a stronger form of attachment to political parties, 
compared to the Australian Election Study question ‘Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National or what?’ (McAllister et al. 2016).  Finally, 
unlike the Australian Election Study, the AuSSA does not measure voting behaviour 
precisely, as it does not distinguish voting in the House of Representatives from voting in the 
Senate.  
Conclusion
Some scholars question the value of persisting with the ‘deficit model’ of climate science 
communication.  As Hornsey and Fielding (2017, 459) argue, ‘increasingly, theorists 
understand there are limits to this approach, and that if people are motivated to reject science, 
then repeating evidence will have little impact’.  Ehret et al. (2017, 272) recommend 
integrating information deficit models with what they call ‘ideological consistency’ models, 
as ‘[W]ithout changing the messaging from political elites, simply communicating more 
about scientific findings will have little effect on partisans.’  Hamilton and Fogg (2019) have 
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also shown that the relationship between climate knowledge and ACC beliefs is nuanced.  
They find evidence consistent with both information deficit and information filtering models 
in the United Statesiv: 
Among Democrats and Independents, greater physical-world knowledge is associated with…higher 
probabilities of agreeing with scientists on ACC.  These patterns are consistent with information deficit 
and its corollary that improving science communication could shift views – for some people.  Among 
Republicans, on the other hand…beliefs about climate change may be less responsive to climate 
communication, if that conflicts with firmly held political views (Hamilton and Fogg 2019, 11).
The utility of replicating research is demonstrated here, as several of the Australian findings 
support Hamilton’s American research.  Hamilton and Fogg (2019) argue that although its 
limitations should be recognised, the deficit model should not be abandoned.  Similarly, the 
absence of an association between climate related facts and acceptance of ACC among 
political conservatives in Australia, suggests that for many people, increasing public 
knowledge of climate change is unlikely to shift their climate change beliefs.  It seems 
Australia and the United States are very similar in this regard.  
What to do?  While the misinformation campaigns of climate denialists are extremely 
damaging to the dissemination of climate science, social psychologists offer a range of 
countering tactics (e.g. see Cook 2017).  Perhaps most importantly, the political divisions 
over climate change in the United States and Australia must be addressed.  Brulle et al. 
(2012, 169) argue that the ‘political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in 
influencing climate change concern.’  Kousser and Tranter (2018, 107) found that cues from 
political leaders can shift public support for climate change policies, with voter polarisation 
decreasing under conditions of elite consensus, while Fielding et al. (2019) show citizens to 
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be ‘more positive about climate change policies when they were endorsed by their political 
ingroup than when the same policy was endorsed by an outgroup’.  
In addition to the information deficit approach of ‘educating’ citizens about climate science, 
it is important to engage with those who distrust climate science (and climate scientists).  
Emphasising the economic, environmental and social benefits of ameliorating climate change 
may be a beneficial strategy for shifting the climate beliefs of conservative citizens.
While the consensus among climate scientists on anthropogenic climate change is well 
documented, a concomitant consensus among political leaders is required to shift public 
attitudes and behaviour, and attenuate political polarisation on this critical issue, particularly 
in countries such as Australia and the United States.  Climate communicators can play an 
important role in encouraging dialogue between rival political elites, and in highlighting the 
non-partisan benefits of mitigating anthropogenic climate change, in order to help build such 
a consensus.  
Citizens of both the United States and Australia are deeply divided over climate change on 
the basis of their political allegiances.  Further, knowledge of climate related facts is not 
associated with acceptance of anthropogenic climate change among Republicans in the US 
(Hamilton and Fogg 2019), nor among politically conservative Australians.  Additional 
research is needed into how climate knowledge influences the acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change, in countries where politics is not such an important determinant of one’s 
stance on this critical global problem.  
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i   In two separate replication studies, the authors of an original research project failed to 
replicate their earlier findings (see Ballard and Lewandowsky, 2015; Sleeth-Keppler et al. 
2019).  
ii   See Hamilton and Fogg (2019, 8), Table 2, ‘Climate’ dependent variable results.
iii  The Australian findings indicate substantial gender differences over value priorities, with 
men (58%) generally more likely than women (47%) to agree that government policy should 
prioritise economic growth over global warming.  Responses vary further when split by party 
allegiances, with 69 per cent of Labor women and 54 per cent of Labor men prioritising 
global warming, compared to 23 per cent of coalition women and 21 per cent of coalition 
men (non-partisan women 53%; men 45%).  
iv Hamilton and Fogg (2019) refer to a range of related ‘information filtering’ models that 
refer to the ‘selective acquisition of information…such as biased assimilation (Corner et al. 
2012; Ehret et al. 2017; McCright and Dunlap 2011), elite cues (Brulle et al. 2012; 
Carmichael and Brulle 2017; Darmofal 2005), motivated reasoning (Kraft et al. 2015; Kunda 
1990; Taber and Lodge 2006), compensatory control (Kay et al. 2009), or cultural cognition 
(Kahan et al. 2011).’  
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Anthropogenic CC Beliefs and Party ID by Sex
 
Figure 2:  Predicted Probabilities of ACC Beliefs and Party Identification by Sex
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Anthropogenic CC Beliefs and Polar Knowledge by Party ID
  
Figure 3:  Predicted Probabilities of ACC Beliefs and Polar Knowledge by Party ID 
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Table 1: Which of the following statements do you personally believe (per cent)
Year 2014 2015 2017
Which of the following statements do you personally believe?
CC is happening now and is mainly caused by human activities 61 67 65
CC is happening now but is caused mainly by natural forces 29 13 19
CC is not happening now 4 5 3
I don’t know whether climate change is happening or not 7 15 13
N (1,380) (1,148) (1,262)
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2014; 2015; 2017)
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Table 2: Polar knowledge (per cent)
Which of the following best describes the… North Pole South Pole
Australia USA Australia USA
Ice a few metres thick floating over a deep ocean 44 44 18 21
Ice more than a kilometre thick over land 25 38 49 52
A mainly rocky, mountainous landscape 4 7 5 14
Don’t know 27 11 28 14
Total 100 100 100 100
N (1,262) (1,411) (1,262) (1,411)
Which of the following possible changes would, if it 
happened, do the most to raise sea levels?
Ice Melt Self-Assessed Knowledge
Australia USA Australia USA 
Melting of land ice in Greenland and the Antarctic 42 34 A great deal 17 24
Melting of Glaciers in the Himalayas and Alaska 4 13 Moderate 48 57
Melting of Sea ice on the Arctic Ocean 18 41 A little 31 16
Don’t know 36 12 Nothing 4 2
Total 100 100 Total 100 100
N (1,263) (1,411) N (1,259) (1,411)
Sources: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2017); Hamilton (2018).
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Table 3: Polar Knowledge compared with Self-Assessed Climate Knowledge (cumulative odds)
Polar scale Self-Assessed 
Women 0.6*** 0.5***
Age (years) 1.011** 1.0002
Degree 1.8*** 1.6***
Income $100K+ 1.2 1.3
No religious affiliation 1.003 0.95
Live in rural area 1.3 1.1
Born in Australia 1.4** 0.97
Party ID (scale) 1.14* 1.32***
Which do you believe…
CC is happening now mainly caused by humans 1 1
CC is happening but mainly natural causes 0.8 0.8
CC is not happening 0.9 1.9
Don’t know 0.3*** 0.1***
McFadden pseudo R2 .04 .09
N (1,259) (1,273)
Notes: * p< .05; ** p< .01 *** p< .001.  
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2017)
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Table 4: Climate Change is happening now and is mainly Anthropogenic (odds)
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Social Background
Women - 1.6*** - 1.7*** 2.0***
Aged (years) - 0.98*** - 0.98*** 0.97***
Degree - 1.9*** - 1.6** 1.6**
Income $100K+ - 1.3 - 1.4 1.5
No religious denomination - 1.8*** - 1.5** 1.5**
Live in rural area - 0.7* - 0.7* 0.7*
Born in Australia - 0.8 - 0.8 0.8
Party ID scale (1-4) - - 2.34*** 2.15*** 1.76***
Polar knowledge scale (0-3) 1.33*** - - 1.36*** 1.22*
Women * Polar knowledge - - - - 1.49**
Women * Party ID - - - - 1.55*
Party ID * Polar knowledge - - - - 1.48***
McFadden pseudo R2 .02 .08 .07 .15 .17
N (1,268) (1,268) (1,268) (1,268) (1,268)
Notes: * p< .05; ** p< .01 *** p< .001. 
Dependent variable: Anthropogenic Climate Change is happening =1; climate change is happening but ‘natural’ 
+ climate change is not happening + don’t know = 0.  
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2017)
Table 5: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Models in Table 4
Model 5 less Nested Variables L.R. χ2 df p Rank
Model 1 Polar Knowledge 22.74 1 <.00001 3
Model 2 Social background 104.35 7 <.00001 2
Model 3 Party ID 81.88 1 <.00001 1
Model 6 less Nested Variables L.R. χ2 df p
Model 5 Interactions 28.66 2 <.00001
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Table 6: Green Voting in Australia (odds)
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Social Background
Women 1.5* 1.2
Aged 18-29 (referent) 1 1
Aged 30-49 1.8* 1.8*
Aged 40-59 1.3 1.4
Aged 60+ (referent) 1 1
Degree 2.0*** 1.5*
Income $100K+ 0.6 0.6
No religious denomination 3.2*** 2.5***
Live in rural area 1.01 1.04
Born in Australia 1.02 0.98
Polar knowledge scale (0-3) 1.32** 1.12
Believe in ACC - - 7.3*** 1.5
Government should Prioritise GW over EG - - - 11.8*** 7.6***
McFadden pseudo R2 .01 .08 .08 .15 .20
N (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151)
Notes:  ^ p< .1 * p< .05; ** p< .01 *** p< .001. 
Dependent variable: Vote Australian Greens =1; other party = 0.  
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (2017)
Table 7: Likelihood Ratio Tests for Models in Table 6
Model 5 less Nested Variables L.R. χ2 df p Rank
Model 1 Polar Knowledge 1.29 1 .2569 4
Model 2 Social background 37.27 8 <.00001 2
Model 3 Party ID 1.40 1 .2369 3
Model 4 Policy Priorities 55.03 1 <.00001 1
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Range N
Dependent Variables
Anthropogenic CC happening now 0.64 0.48 1/0 1268
Polar knowledge scale 1.39 1.04 0-3 1254
Self-assessed climate knowledge 2.82 0.73 1-4 1273
Green vote 0.12 0.32 1/0 1151
Independent Variables
Women 0.55 0.50 1/0 1317
Aged (years) 55.15 17.04 1/0 1317
Degree 0.33 0.47 1/0 1317
Income $100,000+ 0.10 0.30 1/0 1317
No religious affiliation 0.43 0.50 1/0 1317
Live country village/farm 0.15 0.35 1/0 1317
Born in Australia 0.73 0.44 1/0 1317
Party ID scale 2.10 0.84 1-4 1317
Prioritise GW or Economic Growth 0.47 0.50 1/0 1317
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